BALTIC FREEDOM: FERRUM

DATE: 17/09/2026

TIME (GMT): 18:00

ERA: Modern

MAP(S): Maksniemi

TYPE: COOP

TEAMSPEAK: ts1.biaarma.com

GAME: Arma 3

EVENT: Official

AUTHOR(S): Doctor

SLOTS: 67 / 90

---

RATING: not rated yet! (0)

---

1. SITUATION

The Russian offensive into Estonia has lost its initial momentum. During the opening hours of the invasion, Russian forces exploited surprise and local superiority to penetrate rapidly west from the border. Estonian delaying actions subsequently forced the leading Russian formations to deploy repeatedly, expend ammunition and fuel, and fight for successive routes through the border region. By the end of the first day, the advance had slowed sufficiently for Estonian and arriving NATO forces to begin establishing a coherent defensive front.

Russian forces have not been defeated. The formations responsible for the initial advance remain capable of renewing offensive operations, but they are currently attempting to reorganise behind their forward elements. Vehicles require fuel and maintenance, artillery ammunition is being replenished, damaged units are being reorganised, engineers are attempting to restore mobility along obstructed routes, and aircraft and unmanned systems are being brought forward to support the next phase of operations. This pause represents a temporary vulnerability which NATO intends to exploit before the Russians can recover.

Rather than immediately attempting a general counter-offensive, NATO will use air-mobile infantry, reconnaissance elements, aviation and supporting fires to strike the systems that allow the Russian formation to continue fighting. The purpose of FERRUM is to turn a temporary loss of momentum into operational paralysis. Russian artillery, engineers, aviation, reconnaissance, logistics and armoured reserves are to be attacked in depth while they remain dispersed, stationary or occupied with reconstitution.

No requirement exists to seize and permanently hold ground. The force is to identify vulnerable Russian assets, strike them rapidly and withdraw before the enemy can concentrate superior combat power against the raiding force. By the conclusion of the operation, the Russian formations in this sector should possess significantly less ability to resume the offensive, creating the conditions for NATO and Estonian forces to transition to counter-attack.

2. ENEMY FORCES

Russian forces in the AO are assessed to consist of elements of the formations responsible for the previous day's advance, supported by aviation, artillery, engineers, logistics and reconnaissance detachments. Their precise organisation has become increasingly difficult to determine following the disruption caused by the initial fighting. ISR indicates that combat and support elements are now dispersed across a wide area rather than concentrated into a single continuous formation.

Forward Russian infantry and mechanised elements remain in contact with Estonian and NATO forces further west. Reconnaissance patrols have penetrated ahead of the principal Russian support areas and should be expected throughout the central AO, particularly around roads, likely helicopter landing areas and approaches to major Russian positions. Russian reconnaissance and special-purpose troops should be treated as a significant threat to isolated NATO elements. Their purpose is likely to include observation of NATO movement, identification of artillery positions and landing zones, and protection of the flanks of the stalled Russian force.

The main Russian combat formations remain substantially heavier than the NATO force conducting FERRUM. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers remain available in significant numbers. The intention is therefore not to engage Russian manoeuvre formations in a conventional ground battle. Where armoured forces are encountered, commanders should either bypass them or engage from positions of advantage using anti-armour weapons, aviation or supporting fires.

SIGINT and ISR indicate that Russian command is attempting to restore offensive capability as quickly as possible. Artillery units are being resupplied and repositioned, engineers are clearing obstacles and mines along key routes, armoured vehicles are being assembled into new groupings, and rail transport is bringing additional vehicles and supplies into the sector. These activities provide a number of lucrative targets but also indicate that the window for disruption is limited. Once reorganisation is complete, Russian forces will regain the ability to concentrate against NATO raiding elements.

3. RUSSIAN AIRFIELD AND AVIATION

A Russian-controlled airfield in the eastern AO has become an important forward aviation and command facility. ISR confirms the presence of a substantial Russian garrison in the airfield and adjacent barracks area, supported by armoured vehicles and local patrols. Fixed-wing combat aircraft have been moved forward to the airfield, including ground-attack and fighter aircraft, while several unmanned aircraft are being used to identify NATO and Estonian movement for Russian artillery and command elements. Rotary-wing assets have also been observed operating from the facility.

The concentration of aircraft on the ground presents an opportunity to inflict considerably greater effect than attempting to defeat the same systems once airborne. The destruction of tactical aircraft and UAVs is therefore a priority. UAV losses are expected to have an immediate effect on Russian reconnaissance and artillery targeting, while destruction of manned aircraft will reduce the ability of Russian aviation to support a renewed offensive.

NATO electronic-warfare assets will suppress and disrupt Russian radar coverage for the operational window. This does not render the airfield undefended. ISR has identified radar-independent short-range anti-aircraft vehicles within the complex which remain capable of engaging helicopters and low-flying aircraft despite wider radar disruption. These systems must be neutralised before aviation is committed aggressively into the airfield area. Black 1 reconnaissance elements are best positioned to locate and destroy these systems while maintaining the smallest possible signature.

Commanders are also to assume the presence of MANPADS and vehicle-mounted weapons throughout the airfield garrison. Helicopters should therefore avoid prolonged exposure over the objective and should not orbit within small-arms or short-range air-defence envelopes while ground forces conduct clearance.

4. RUSSIAN ARTILLERY

Russian artillery has been responsible for sustained fires against Estonian and NATO positions throughout the fighting. ISR has identified a mixed artillery position in the central-eastern AO containing self-propelled artillery and multiple-launch rocket capability. The site is assessed to be temporarily static while ammunition is replenished and the guns are prepared for renewed operations.

The artillery position represents one of the highest-value targets available during FERRUM. Destroying the guns will directly reduce Russian ability to support both defensive operations and any subsequent attempt to resume the advance. The site should nevertheless be approached as an artillery position rather than an isolated vehicle park. Local security, observation posts and supporting infantry should be expected, with additional Russian forces potentially capable of responding from neighbouring areas.

Where practical, reconnaissance should precede the assault so that aircraft, artillery and ground manoeuvre can be coordinated against the position simultaneously. Destruction of artillery systems is more important than prolonged clearance of surrounding terrain.

5. RUSSIAN ENGINEERS AND MOBILITY

Russian combat engineers are attempting to clear mines and obstacles from the northern MSR in preparation for the movement of follow-on forces. Their presence indicates that the route remains important to Russian plans and that the earlier disruption of the road network continues to affect the offensive.

The engineer element is supported by specialist recovery, repair and communications vehicles and should be considered a high-value target. Destroying the unit will have an effect greater than the immediate personnel losses by forcing the Russians either to divert additional engineering assets or continue operating through restricted routes.

Priority should be given to specialist vehicles, engineering equipment and personnel where positively identified. The purpose of the raid is to preserve the obstacles already delaying Russian movement and increase the time required to reopen the axis.

6. RUSSIAN RAIL RESUPPLY

ISR has identified a newly arrived Russian military train in the south-eastern portion of the AO. The train is carrying fuel, equipment and military vehicles intended to replenish forces in the sector. Vehicle loads include command, reconnaissance, artillery and combat-support assets.

The train is particularly vulnerable while unloading. Once its cargo disperses onto the road network, the same equipment will become considerably more difficult to locate and destroy. If the opportunity remains available following the airfield raid, NATO elements are therefore to attack the railhead and render both the cargo and supporting vehicles unusable.

Fuel-bearing rolling stock presents the possibility of significant secondary effects. Commanders should account for blast, fire and fragmentation hazards when selecting assault and extraction positions.

7. RUSSIAN ARMOURED RESERVE

A reinforced Russian armoured grouping has assembled in the south-eastern AO and is assessed to be preparing for movement toward the front. ISR has identified a mixture of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and command/support platforms.

The grouping represents combat power which Russian commanders could use either to resume the offensive or respond to NATO raids elsewhere in the sector. It should therefore be disrupted before it can deploy. Complete destruction is not required to achieve the desired operational effect; disabling key vehicles, command assets and sufficient heavy armour to prevent the formation moving as a coherent force will materially assist the wider operation.

This is the most dangerous of the secondary objectives. Ground forces should not enter a prolonged direct-fire engagement with an organised Russian armoured element. Reconnaissance, Javelin teams, aviation and artillery should be used to create an asymmetric engagement, after which the raiding force should disengage before neighbouring Russian units can react.

8. TERRAIN AND WEATHER

The AO remains dominated by extensive forest, road and rail corridors, dispersed military facilities and areas of relatively open agricultural ground. Forest provides excellent concealment for reconnaissance teams and helicopter landing zones but can restrict observation and complicate coordination between dispersed elements. Roads permit rapid movement but are also the most likely locations for Russian patrols and mechanised reaction forces.

The dispersed nature of the Russian rear area creates numerous potential helicopter landing zones, but commanders should not assume that terrain behind the Russian forward line is secure simply because no formed enemy unit is visible. Reconnaissance elements have pushed considerably further west than many Russian support formations, and local security patrols may be encountered throughout the AO.

Operations begin at approximately 0300 hrs. Forecast conditions are predominantly clear with limited cloud cover, light winds and no significant fog or precipitation. These conditions are favourable for aviation and night-vision operations but provide little natural concealment from thermal or night observation systems. Darkness remains an important advantage during the opening stages and should be exploited to place reconnaissance elements and assault forces before the enemy's ability to observe NATO aviation improves.

9. FRIENDLY FORCES

The principal manoeuvre force is Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, consisting of Company Headquarters and two infantry platoons with four rifle squads. The company is configured for helicopter-borne assault and possesses substantial organic anti-armour capability, including SMAW and MAAWS systems distributed throughout the rifle squads.

Black 1 provides the dedicated reconnaissance element. The section includes a Section Commander and 2IC, sniper and spotter team, dedicated medical support, Forward Air Controller, Javelin teams and scouts equipped for remote observation. Black 1 should normally precede the main company against major objectives, confirm enemy dispositions, identify air-defence and armoured threats, and establish conditions for helicopter insertion and supporting fires.

A NATO aviation detachment provides four UH-60M utility helicopters for troop lift and one armed UH-60 equipped with external weapon systems. The aviation element gives the force the ability to move rapidly between geographically separated objectives and bypass Russian forces positioned along the road network. That mobility is the principal advantage available to Alpha Company and should not be sacrificed by repeatedly operating aircraft over known enemy positions.

An attached artillery element provides two M109 self-propelled howitzers for supporting fires. Their principal value lies in suppressing or destroying high-value Russian systems identified by Black 1 and isolating objectives during air assaults. Artillery should be coordinated closely with aviation timings to avoid delaying raids while ground forces wait for unnecessary preparatory fires.

Friendly Estonian and NATO formations remain in contact with Russian forces to the west and south-west. Their purpose during FERRUM is principally to hold the existing front and prevent the Russians from freeing large manoeuvre elements to respond to the raids. Alpha Company should not expect immediate reinforcement if it becomes fixed deep inside the Russian rear area.

10. MISSION

Alpha Company, supported by Black 1, NATO aviation and attached artillery, conducts air-mobile raids and reconnaissance operations throughout the Russian rear area in order to destroy critical aviation, ISR, artillery, engineering, logistics and armoured capabilities, preventing Russian forces from restoring offensive momentum and setting conditions for a subsequent NATO counter-attack.

The force is to achieve maximum destruction of Russian operational capability while avoiding prolonged engagements against Russian formations capable of concentrating superior combat power.

11. COMMANDER'S INTENT

The purpose of FERRUM is to prevent the Russian force from recovering from the disruption imposed during the previous day's fighting. The enemy currently possesses the personnel and equipment required to resume its advance, but these assets are dispersed while being refuelled, repaired, resupplied and reorganised. That vulnerability will not persist.

The force is therefore to operate aggressively but selectively. Reconnaissance will identify weak points and high-value targets; aviation will allow infantry to bypass the enemy's forward screen; artillery and armed aircraft will suppress or destroy threats that would otherwise require a deliberate ground attack; and the assault force will remain on an objective only for as long as necessary to achieve the required effect.

Ground is of no value unless required temporarily to destroy the enemy located on it. Commanders should resist the tendency to convert successful raids into defensive battles. Once an objective has been rendered combat ineffective, the force should extract, reorganise and move against the next target before the Russians establish a coherent response.

The desired end state is that Russian forward formations remain stalled; their artillery support is significantly degraded; engineer units are unable to restore key routes; aviation and UAV support from the forward airfield has been crippled; incoming rail resupply has been destroyed or disrupted; and the armoured reserve intended to restore momentum has suffered sufficient losses that it cannot immediately undertake offensive action. NATO forces should then be positioned to transition from containment of the Russian advance to preparation for counter-offensive operations.

12. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The operation will initially focus on the Russian airfield complex. Black 1 is to identify and destroy the radar-independent short-range air-defence systems protecting the site while NATO EW suppresses the wider Russian radar picture. The reconnaissance element should also establish the disposition of the airfield garrison, identify suitable helicopter approaches and landing zones, and report significant armoured or rotary-wing threats.

Once the immediate air-defence threat has been reduced, Alpha Company will conduct a rapid air assault against the airfield and adjacent barracks. Priority is the destruction of Russian combat aircraft and surveillance UAVs, followed by disruption of the local garrison sufficiently to prevent rapid recovery of the facility. The objective should be treated as a raid rather than an occupation. Aircraft should remain exposed for the minimum time necessary to insert and recover the assault force.

Following neutralisation of the airfield, command will exploit the resulting freedom of action against additional targets as the tactical situation allows. Current intelligence identifies the artillery position, combat-engineer detachment, rail resupply site and armoured grouping as the most important opportunities. These objectives are widely separated and need not be attacked in a fixed sequence. Alpha Company and Black 1 should select targets according to enemy reaction, aviation availability, remaining ammunition and the operational value of each objective.

Where practicable, Black 1 should continue operating ahead of the company rather than becoming absorbed into the main assault force. Observation of secondary objectives can occur while the company completes an earlier raid, allowing rapid retasking rather than forcing the entire formation to conduct reconnaissance after each extraction.

The enemy should be expected to adapt once the first raid becomes apparent. Russian local security will increase, vehicles may disperse, air-defence assets may reposition and mechanised reaction forces may attempt to identify likely helicopter landing zones. The tempo of FERRUM is therefore important. Every delay gives the enemy additional time to convert vulnerable concentrations into defended positions.

13. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

Black 1 is to conduct reconnaissance of the Russian airfield, locate and neutralise radar-independent anti-aircraft systems, identify suitable helicopter approaches and landing zones, and provide terminal control for supporting aviation and fires. Following the initial raid, Black 1 is to continue reconnaissance of designated secondary targets and provide early warning of Russian reaction forces.

1st Platoon is to form one of Alpha Company's principal air-assault manoeuvre elements. It is to conduct rapid clearance and destruction tasks against assigned objectives, preserving its anti-armour weapons for Russian vehicles that threaten the assault or extraction.

2nd Platoon is to form the second principal manoeuvre element and should be prepared either to assault a separate objective or reinforce 1st Platoon where resistance exceeds the capability of a single platoon. The Company Commander should avoid committing both platoons simultaneously unless the value of the objective or enemy strength justifies the concentration.

The aviation detachment is to provide tactical lift, casualty evacuation where required and armed aviation support. Flight routes should exploit terrain and avoid repeated approaches to the same landing zones. Aircraft are not to remain static on objectives once passengers have been inserted or recovered.

The artillery element is to provide responsive fires against identified enemy concentrations, air-defence positions, artillery systems and armoured threats. Fires are to be integrated with the raid plan rather than used as routine preparation against every objective. Surprise remains more valuable than volume where a target can be approached without warning.

14. FIRES AND AVIATION

Aviation is the element that makes the operation possible and should be treated as a finite combat capability rather than transport that can be exposed repeatedly without consequence. Landing zones should be offset from known Russian positions where practical, with dismounted movement completing the final approach. Hot extraction directly from an objective should be reserved for situations where speed outweighs the air-defence risk.

The armed UH-60 can provide valuable suppression against infantry and light vehicles but should not be committed against established anti-aircraft systems or heavy armour unless those threats have already been suppressed. The aircraft is most useful during insertion and extraction, where brief fires can prevent enemy infantry from manoeuvring against vulnerable transport helicopters.

M109 fires should concentrate on targets whose destruction materially reduces Russian capability. Artillery, concentrated infantry, static air defence and armoured vehicles in assembly areas provide appropriate targets. Isolated personnel and targets likely to be destroyed by the assault force without difficulty generally do not justify expenditure or loss of surprise.

Black 1's Forward Air Controller and the company JTAC are responsible for ensuring that aviation and indirect fires support the ground scheme rather than dictate it. The sequence should remain reconnaissance, target identification, isolation, assault and extraction.

15. CONTACT AND DISENGAGEMENT

Unlike TEMPESTAS, FERRUM is not a delaying operation and there is no requirement to maintain continuous contact with the enemy. Once Russian forces begin concentrating against a raid, the balance of advantage is already shifting away from NATO.

Commanders should therefore break contact before Russian local superiority can be established. A Russian reaction force does not necessarily need to be destroyed if it can be bypassed, delayed by artillery or avoided through helicopter extraction. The purpose of the operation is to remove the systems required for the next Russian offensive, not to attrit every Russian infantry or mechanised unit encountered.

If a raid becomes decisively engaged, company command should use aviation, artillery and an uncommitted manoeuvre element to reopen freedom of movement rather than reinforce indefinitely into the same fight.

16. SERVICE SUPPORT

The force begins from a prepared NATO aviation support area containing medical, ammunition, fuel and aircraft-servicing capability. Helicopters should return to the support location as required rather than attempting to sustain prolonged operations from improvised forward sites.

Ammunition expenditure should be considered across the entire operation. Demolition equipment will be particularly important at the airfield, railhead and artillery positions, while Javelin, MAAWS and SMAW ammunition must be preserved for armoured threats encountered during later raids.

Casualties should be evacuated during planned extractions where possible. Establishing a prolonged casualty collection point inside Russian-held territory will restrict mobility and risk drawing the remainder of the company into a static defence.

17. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Overall command rests with Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion. Black 1 remains a reconnaissance asset under company control and should maintain regular reporting even when operating independently of the main manoeuvre elements. Aviation and artillery commanders are to remain integrated into company planning throughout the operation so that insertion, fires and extraction can be retasked rapidly as new intelligence develops.

Priority reports include the location and status of Russian air-defence systems, aircraft and UAV dispersal, movement of mechanised reaction forces, artillery activity, progress of engineer clearance operations, unloading or dispersal of the rail resupply, movement of the armoured grouping, and indications that the Russians are abandoning vulnerable concentrations in response to NATO raids.

18. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

The most likely Russian response is initially local. Airfield security, nearby armoured vehicles and reconnaissance patrols will attempt to contain the first raid while higher headquarters determines its scale. Once it becomes clear that NATO is conducting a wider deep operation, Russian commanders are likely to increase air-defence readiness, disperse vehicles from known assembly areas and redirect mechanised forces toward threatened objectives. The effectiveness of later raids will therefore depend heavily on the speed with which the force transitions between targets.

The most dangerous Russian response would be to anticipate the helicopter pattern and position mobile air defence or mechanised forces near likely landing and extraction areas. A successful ambush against the aviation detachment would immediately reduce Alpha Company's ability to operate throughout the AO and could isolate ground elements deep behind Russian positions. Reusing routes and landing zones should therefore be avoided wherever alternatives exist.

Current intelligence assesses that the Russian offensive has reached a temporary point of vulnerability. Its forward formations have expended much of the momentum gained during the opening attack, while the supporting systems necessary to restore that momentum are exposed throughout the rear area. FERRUM is intended to exploit that condition before it disappears. If the airfield, artillery, engineers, logistical resupply and armoured reserve can be disrupted in quick succession, the Russian problem will cease to be simply a stalled advance. It will become an offensive force without the immediate means to restart its attack.