Operation Compass - The Battle of Sidi Barrani

published on: 29/03/2026

Author: W. Jarvis

Historical summary of the opening stages of Operation Compass

On the 13th of September 1940, Italian forces launched Operazione E, otherwise known as the Italian invasion of the Kingdom of Egypt. Skirmishes between Italian and Commonwealth forces had been taking place since Italy had joined the Second World War as an Axis participant on the 10th of June 1940, however, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had envisioned an Italian advance from Libya all the way to the Egyptian capital city of Cairo with the aim of cutting off British access to the Suez canal. Operazione E would turn out to be one of the most costly Italian campaigns of the Second World War.

Mussolini had intended for his invasion of Egypt to coincide with Italy’s entry into the war but this was not possible, mainly due to the poor state of readiness among the Italian 10th Army. Many of the divisions of the 10th Army had still not updated to the new ‘binary division’ (divisione binaria) standard following military reforms in 1938, which meant that these older formations lacked modern small arms weapons, artillery, anti tank weapons, trucks and communications equipment. Further complicating matters for the Italians was the aggressive nature of British defence along the frontier, who had been ordered by Lieutenant-General Archibald Wavell, commander of the Western Desert Force (WDF), to continually skirmish with Italian forces through patrols and raiding actions in order to maintain tactical dominance over the Italians. As a result of these challenges, the ambitious plan of cutting the Suez canal was redrawn to reflect the realities faced by the Italian army at the tactical and operational level, favouring an initial advance towards the port town of Mersa Matruh before continuing the advance once adequate logistical chains had been established.

The Italian invasion began with a large scale artillery bombardment before infantry and tanks advanced on the frontline British positions, with the 1st Libyan Division securing the village of Musiad as well as the town of Sollum alongside its airfield, while the 2nd Libyan Division and the ‘Maletii Group’ advanced from Sidi Omar (after getting lost previously, requiring assistance from Italian aircraft to locate their positions) towards Halfaya Pass where the two columns converged. The British however, outnumbered by Italian forces, had fought a successful rearguard action and thus managed to avoid being encircled, in part due to armoured cars and tanks harassing the Italians as well as mines, placed in anticipation of an Italian invasion, causing casualties amongst advancing Italian units. The next day, British forces continued to harass the Italians as they withdrew past Buq Buq, then to Alam Hamid on the 15th, followed by Alam el Deb on the 16th. An Italian armoured force then attempted to outflank the British at Alam el Dab leading to the remaining British forces retreating to the east of Sidi Barrani back to the stronghold of Mersa Matruh under the impression that Italian forces would continue their advance, with the town of Sidi Barrani subsequently occupied by the Italians later that day.

Despite the initial successes of Operazione E, the Italian commander, Rodolfo Graziani, was acutely aware of the severe logistical challenges faced by his units; furthermore, much of his force lacked transport vehicles so were forced to march through the blistering heat of the desert. Having secured Sidi Barrani, Graziani had no choice but to halt the advance short of its operational objective and order his force to prepare defensive positions. During this period of relative calm on the frontline, Italian forces repaired roads damaged during the British rearguard action and commenced work on constructing a water pipeline from the Libyan frontier while ammunition and fuel supplies were brought up from the rear. By December, the Italians had been reinforced with about nine infantry, Blackshirt and colonial divisions and had constructed an array of fortified camps that spanned from the sea to the escarpment. During this time, British forces continued to harass the Italians with armoured car patrols and infantry raids, alongside attacks launched by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to hamper supply lines and cause attrition amongst Italian troops, whilst reinforcements arrived, namely additional tanks and armoured cars.

With Italian forces holding a defensive posture in preparation of a renewed offensive in December, Wavell had ordered the commander of British Troops Egypt, Lieutenant-General Henry Wilson, to plan a small scale operation to push the Italian force back over the Libyan border, calling for a five day raid that could be extended depending on if the operation succeeded. Reconnaissance performed by the Long Range Desert Group had revealed to the British that the Italian defensive positions were too far apart from each other to provide mutual support if attacked, with several gaps in the Italian frontline also identified, such as at Bir Enba. The 7th Support Group (the infantry, artillery and anti tank component of the 7th Armoured Division) would be tasked with observing the Italian camps at Sofafi and preventing them from manoeuvring to the west, while the tanks and the 4th Indian Division passed through the Sofafi–Nibeiwa gap. To the south, a Brigade of Indian infantry supported by Matilda II tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment would attack Nibeiwa before attacking Tummars. Finally, the Matruh Garrison Force (3rd Battalion, Coldstream Guards) was assigned the task of attacking the Italian camp at Wadi Maktila on the coast, while the Royal Navy bombarded Wadi Maktila and Sidi Barrani. Once all units had achieved their objectives, on the second day Sidi Barrani would be stormed by the 4th Indian Division before a general advance to the west.

British forces would launch their counterattack on the 9th of December, mere days before the Italians themselves planned to continue their advance towards Cairo, with the British motorised and armoured force advancing as planned through the Sofafi–Nibeiwa gap at Bir Enba, resulting in the Italians at Nibeiwa being caught completely off guard by the 4th Indian Division. These initial skirmishes were confused and difficult for British commanders to manage due to uncertainty over the locations of Italian defensive positions, as well as dust storms reducing visibility, however, they had succeeded in penetrating the enemy's defensive line with many Italian units retreating in disarray, casualties were particularly heavy amongst the Italian armoured force who were fielding outdated and poorly armed tanks that were no match for the Cruiser and Matilda tanks used by the British. Selby Force (a 1,800 man strong force made up of the Matruah Garrison Force, named after Brigadier A. R. Selby) who had been assigned the task of guarding the eastern approaches to Sidi Barrani, were later ordered to block the western exits from Wadi Maktila after the fall of Nibeiwa, an order which came too late in the day, allowing much of the 1st Libyan Division to escape encirclement. To the south, the 7th Armoured Brigade remained in reserve whilst the 7th Support Group blocked an approach between Rabia and Sofafi. With the route to the vital coastal road now clear, the 16th Infantry Brigade was ordered to cut the roads into Sidi Barrani later on the 9th, supported by two field artillery regiments and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment.

By the morning of the 10th of December, the 4th Armoured Brigade, which had been screening ahead of the main British thrust against a possible Italian counterattack from the west had reached Buq Buq, effectively completing the encirclement of a 40,000 man strong Italian and colonial force around Sidi Barrani. Following the encirclement, the town would be defended by two Italian divisions in eight strong points around the town, each of which was held by a battalion of infantry. Now in position, the 16th Infantry Brigade would launch its assault on Sidi Barrani at 06:00am without waiting for divisional artillery or tank support (7th RTR was late), however this thrust was repulsed by the Italian defenders due to the poor weather conditions and lack of artillery preparation. The British were reinforced three hours later with field artillery and heavy tanks, who once again were on the offensive, this time supported by a squadron of Matilda tanks, RAF air support and a bombardment by Royal Navy ships offshore. Vicious fighting took place on the outskirts of Sidi Barrani during the morning of the 10th, with many Italian positions being overrun by the British heavy tanks, which the Italians lacked any effective counter to due to the loss of the Italian armoured component the previous day, with machine guns, grenades and even artillery fired over open sights being ineffectual, little could stop the advance of British forces. At 10:00am, an Italian force of around 2,000 Blackshirts that had risen up from their positions in preparation for an apparent counter attack against the British, instead surrendered themselves. By the end of the morning of the 10th, the southern defences had been successfully breached by the British, who had also overrun the Italian artillery lines in that sector.

Facing a hopeless situation, the Italian Blackshirts holding two of the strong points to the west of Sidi Barrani would suddenly surrender at around 01:30pm allowing the 16th Infantry Brigade to cut the south and west roads from the town, completing the encirclement of Italian forces still defending Sidi Barrani. With the initiative now firmly in British hands, the local commander, 4th Indian Division Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-General Noel Beresford-Pierce, ordered a final assault on Sidi Barrani before nightfall, which it was feared would allow Italian units to slip through the British encirclement. The 16th would advance with the last of the 7th RTRs operational Matilda tanks, supported by an additional Indian infantry battalion and cruiser tanks of the 2nd RTR, at 04:00pm backed by an artillery bombardment. Matilda tanks of the 7th RTR would advance on the western side of Sidi Barrani through a sandstorm whilst under ineffective Italian artillery fire, with the gunline being overrun and its gunners forced to flee into the town. The remaining outer defensive strong points would continue to resist for the next hour before finally surrendering around 06:00pm, leaving only a mixed force made up of the Blackshirt legion and the remnants of the 1st Libyan Division occupying a 4km sector east of the harbour by the end of the day.

While Sidi Barrani was being stormed by the 16th Infantry Brigade, Selby Force had been busy following the retreat of the 1st Libyan Division, the 2nd Libyan Division and the 4th CC.NN. Division as it was retreating from Wadi Maktila to Sidi Barrani after the loss of Tummars. Selby Force would trap the rear of the retreating column in sand dunes on the coast road before cruiser tanks of the 6th RTR arrived during a sandstorm, overrunning the Italians by about 05:15pm, who then joined Selby Force as it continued to pursuit the routed Italians.

British forces would launch their final attack against Sidi Barrani at dawn on the 11th of December, with mass surrenders following soon after, except at the Ras el Dai fortified camp located at Point 90 where a force of around 2,000 colonial troops of the 2nd and 16th Battalions of the 2nd Libyan Division held out until being annihilated by the early afternoon. Following this final action, Sidi Barrani would be completely under British control by the end of the 11th of December, securing a major British victory over the Italians in the desert. By the 15th, Sollum and the Halfaya Pass were once again under British control, effectively dislodging Italian forces from Egyptian territory.

The Battle for Sidi Barrani and its surrounding areas had been a complete victory for the Western Desert Force, and an incredibly successful opening to Operation Compass. Commonwealth forces had inflicted a severe blow to the Italian army stationed in Libya, with the Italian 63rd Infantry Division, 64th Infantry Division and the armoured ‘Maletii Group’ suffering terrible casualties as it was routed after the fall of Nibeiwa, Sofafi and Tummars. Italian auxiliary units would fare no better against the British around Wadi Maktila and Sidi Barrani, with an Italian Blackshirt unit (4th CC.NN. Division), 1st Libyan Division and 2nd Division effectively ceasing to exist after the battle. The Italians suffered 47 officers and 2,147 other ranks dead, with a further 2,208 wounded as a result of fighting, in comparison to a relatively light 624 casualties for Commonwealth forces. An unexpected variable the commander of British Troops Egypt, Lieutenant-General Henry Wilson, when he’d planned this operation had been the sheer amount of Italian and Libyan soldiers which had surrendered, so much so, that the 4th Armoured Brigade at Buq Buq had to be reinforced just to safely handle the thousands of Prisoners of War it had captured as they retreated from Sidi Barrani and elsewhere, braving naval gunfire along the coast road from the Royal Navy ships HMS Terror and two gunboats stationed offshore. In total, the recorded number of POWs had been 38,300 soldiers; one of the largest Italian mass surrenders of the Second World War.